Current Circuit Splits
The following pages contain brief summaries, drafted by the
members of the Seton Hall Circuit Review, of circuit splits identified by
federal court of appeals opinions between October 2009 and March
2010. This collection is organized by civil and criminal matters, then by
subject matter.
Each summary briefly describes a current circuit split. It is intended
to give only the briefest synopsis of the circuit split, not a comprehensive
analysis. This compilation makes no claim to be exhaustive, but will
hopefully serve the reader well as a reference starting point.
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CIVIL MATTERS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
False Claims Act (“FCA”) – Public Disclosure Jurisdictional Bar: U.S.
ex rel. Ondis v. Woonsocket, 587 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2009)
The 1st Circuit addressed the meaning of the phrase “based upon”
as used in the public disclosure jurisdictional bar to putative qui tam
actions brought under the FCA. Id. at 53, 57. The court noted that under
the FCA, one of the prongs for determining if the qui tam action is barred
relies on whether the relator’s suit is “based upon” publicly disclosed
allegations or transactions. Id. at 53. The court noted that the 2nd, 3rd,
7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th and D.C. Circuits determined that “as long as the
relator’s allegations are substantially similar to information disclosed
publicly, the relator’s claim is ‘based upon’ the public disclosure even if
he actually obtained his information from a different source,” while the
4th Circuit alone requires “proof that the relator’s allegations are actually
derived from the publicly disclosed information.” Id. at 57. The 1st
Circuit agreed with the 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th and D.C.
Circuits in finding that a broader reading of the phrase “based upon”
comports with the overall structure and purpose of the FCA to preclude
“qui tam actions that merely parrot previously disclosed allegations or
transactions.” Id. at 58. The court disagreed with the 4th Circuit’s
position that “a relator’s allegations actually must be derived from a
public disclosure in order to trigger the jurisdictional bar,” because under
such an interpretation, the “original source” exception would be read out
of the statute. Id. Thus the 1st Circuit concluded that the “based upon”
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requirement is satisfied “when the relator’s allegations are substantially
similar to allegations or transactions already in the public domain at the
time he brings his qui tam action.” Id.
BANKRUPTCY LAW
Automatic Stay Violations – Attorneys Fees: Sternberg v. Johnston, 582
F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2009)
The 9th Circuit addressed whether damages for an attorney’s
violation of his affirmative duty to educate a state court on the extent of a
bankruptcy stay can include attorney’s fees incurred in prosecuting the
action against the violating party. Id. at 1116. The court recognized that
the 5th Circuit—the only court of appeals to have previously addressed
the issue—concluded that “it is proper to award attorney’s fees that were
incurred prosecuting [the claim].” Id. at 1124. However, the 9th Circuit
found this language unpersuasive, and instead held that “only those
attorney fees related to enforcing the automatic stay and remedying the
stay violation, not the fees incurred in prosecuting the bankruptcy
adversary proceeding in which he pursued his claim for those damages,”
are recoverable. Id. at 1116.
Standard of Review – Equitable Mootness: Search Mkt. Direct, Inc. v.
Jubber (In re Paige), 584 F.3d 1327 (10th Cir. 2009)
The 10th Circuit addressed “whether a district court’s ultimate
determination of equitable mootness should be reviewed de novo or for
abuse of discretion.” Id. at 1334–35. The court noted that the 5th, 6th,
and 11th Circuits have reviewed the determination of equitable mootness
de novo, while the 3rd Circuit created a split by opting to review these
determinations for abuse of discretion. Id. at 1335. The 10th Circuit
expressed the view that the split was “likely [due to] the unique role of
the district courts in the bankruptcy context.” Id. The position of the
majority of the circuits is that the district court acts as an appellate court
in a bankruptcy case and therefore the appellate court must review the
decision de novo based on legal determinations. Id. Alternatively, the 3rd
Circuit previously held that a determination of equitable mootness is
discretionary and must be granted some deference. Id. The 10th Circuit
noted that it has already adopted the abuse-of-discretion standard “in the
similar context of prudential mootness.” Id. Therefore, the 10th Circuit
agreed with the 3rd Circuit and “adopt[ed] the abuse-of-discretion
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standard of review for determinations of equitable mootness in
bankruptcy cases.” Id.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Competency to Stand Trial – Burden of Proof: United States v.
Whittington, 586 F.3d 613 (7th Cir. 2009)
The 7th Circuit addressed “which party has the burden of proof at a
competency hearing” under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d). Id. at 617. The court
noted that the 4th and 10th Circuits placed the burden of proof on the
defendant to prove incompetence, while the 3rd, 5th, 7th and 9th Circuits
placed the burden on the government to prove competence. The 11th
Circuit placed the burden with the party moving to determine
competency, and the 2nd Circuit declined to address the issue because
“[t]he allocation of the burden of proof to the defendant will affect
competency determinations only in a narrow class of cases where the
evidence is in equipoise.” Id. at 618. The 7th Circuit agreed with the 4th
and 10th Circuits in finding that the burden should be placed on the
defendant. Id. The court disagreed with the 3rd, 5th, 7th and 9th Circuits
and found the decisions of those courts “inconsistent with Supreme Court
precedent that holds the accused in a federal prosecution must prove
incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. Thus the 7th
Circuit concluded that the defendant has the burden of proof at a
competency hearing. Id.
Jurisdiction – Forum Selection Clause: Wong v. Partygaming Ltd., 589
F.3d 821 (6th Cir. 2009)
The 6th Circuit addressed whether state or federal law governs the
inquiry into the enforceability of a forum selection clause when a federal
court exercises diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 826. The court noted that a
majority of circuits have determined that “the enforceability of a forum
selection clause implicates federal procedure and should therefore be
governed by federal law,” while the 7th and 10th Circuits found that the
law that governs the contract as a whole also governs the enforceability
of the forum selection clause. Id. at 827. The 6th Circuit agreed with the
majority of circuits in finding “forum selection clauses significantly
implicate federal procedure issues. Id. Thus the 6th Circuit concluded
that federal law governs the enforceability of a forum selection clause
when a federal court exercises diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 828.
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Remedies – Attorneys’ Fees: Fox v. Vice, 594 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2010)
The 5th Circuit addressed whether a defendant has to prevail over
an entire suit in order to recover attorneys’ fees for frivolous 42 U.S.C. §
1983 claims. Id. at 428. The court noted that the majority of circuits hold
that a defendant does not have to prevail over an entire suit to recover
attorneys’ fees. Id. The 5th Circuit agreed with the 9th and 11th Circuits
that “it would undermine the intent of Congress to allow plaintiffs to
prosecute frivolous claims without consequences merely because those
claims were joined with additional non-frivolous claims.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). The 5th Circuit stated that “[s]uch a rule
would also make a defendant’s entitlement to attorneys’ fees ‘depend not
upon the district court’s review of the merits of a plaintiff’s § 1983
claims, but upon how a plaintiff chose to draft his complaint.” Id. at 428–
29. Thus the 5th Circuit concluded that the district court did not abuse its
discretion when awarding defendant attorney’s fees even though
defendant did not prevail on the entire suit. Id. at 429.
Removal –Timely Filing: Barbour v. Int’l Union, 594 F.3d 315 (4th Cir.
2010)
The 4th Circuit addressed how to calculate timely filing for removal
when multiple defendants were served at different times and one or more
of the defendants were served outside the original 30-day period required
by 28 U.S.C. 1446(b). Id. at 319. The court noted the 5th Circuit’s “firstserved defendant rule,” under which the “[30-day] period begins to run
as soon as the first defendant is served.” Id. The court also noted the
“last-served defendant rule” favored by the 6th, 8th, and 11th Circuits,
which “permits each defendant, upon formal service of process, thirty
days to file a notice of removal.” Id. at 319–20. The court also discussed
the “middle ground rule,” a position that a 4th Circuit panel had
expressed. Id. at 320. The “middle ground rule” would have allowed
later-served defendants who filed within 30 days of being served to join a
valid removal petition, but would have prevented those defendants from
filing for removal if the earlier-served defendants had not filed within the
statutory period or had filed defective petitions. Id. Because the “middle
ground rule” was not essential to the 4th Circuit’s previous decision, the
court reasoned that it was not bound to follow the middle-ground rule. Id.
at 321–22. The 4th Circuit disagreed with the middle ground and firstserved defendant rules because “[u]nder either . . . rule, [the later-served
defendant]’s right of removal would have been waived by the [firstserved defendant]’s failure to file a notice of removal within 30 days of
being served even though it was not yet within the court’s jurisdiction.”
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Id. at 324. “Such prejudice . . . would violate the spirit, if not the letter,
of the ‘bedrock principle’ that ‘a defendant is not obliged to engage in
litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court’s
authority, by formal process.’” Id. Thus, the 4th Circuit concluded “in
cases involving multiple defendants, each defendant, once served with
formal process, has 30 days to file a notice of removal pursuant to § 28
U.S.C. 1446(b) in which earlier-served defendants may join regardless of
whether they have previously filed a notice of removal.” Id. at 326.
Social Security Act – Attorney Fees: Walker v. Astrue, 593 F.3d 274 (3d
Cir. 2010)
The 3rd Circuit addressed “what filing deadline under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure governs a petition for attorney fees under
Section 406(b) of the Social Security Act when a case is remanded under
sentence four of Section 405(g) for a determination of benefits[.]” Id. at
276. The court noted that the 5th and 11th Circuits have held that Rule
54(d)(2)’s 14-day filing deadline applies, while the 10th Circuit has held
that the “reasonable time” standard under Rule 60(b) applies. Id. The 3rd
Circuit agreed with the 5th and 11th Circuits in finding that Rule
54(d)(2) is the appropriate standard. Id. The court disagreed with the
10th Circuit’s approach because the use of the “reasonable time”
standard “finds little support in the law,” as the 10th Circuit relied on the
7th Circuit’s reading of Rule 54 prior to its 1993 amendment, “which
contained no time limit for filing and which courts interpreted to contain
‘an implicit requirement of reasonableness.’” Id. at 279. Thus, the 3rd
Circuit concluded that “Rule 54(d)(2) is the appropriate avenue through
which counsel can seek attorney fees following a § 406(b) administrative
remand.” Id. at 280. The 3rd Circuit further held that “the application of
the filing deadline is tolled until the notice of award is issued by the
Commissioner and counsel is notified of that award.” Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Exclusionary Rule — Retroactivity of Constitutional Decision: United
States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2010)
The 11th Circuit reviewed an exclusionary rule case in light of the
Supreme Court decision in Arizona v. Gant, 552 U.S. 1230 (2008), which
was rendered during the pendency of the appeal. Id. at 1261. That
decision broadened the scope of the exclusionary rule by limiting a
search of a vehicle incident to an arrest to situations where “the arrestee
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is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of
the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of
the offense of arrest.” Id. at 1262. The circuits are split regarding the
“retroactivity of a constitutional decision.” Id. The 5th and 10th Circuits
do not apply the exclusionary rule retroactively, in opposition to the 9th
Circuit. Id. at 1264. The 11th Circuit sided with the 5th and 10th
Circuits, holding that although the defendant was subject to an illegal
search in violation of the Fourth Amendment, it would not “tie the
retroactivity of new Fourth Amendment rules to the suppression of
evidence.” Id. at 1265. The 11th Circuit explained that “[b]ecause the
exclusionary rule is justified solely by its potential to deter police
misconduct, suppressing evidence obtained from an unlawful search is
inappropriate when the offending officer reasonably relie[s] on wellsettled precedent.” Id. at 1266. The 11th Circuit concluded that “the
good-faith exception [which] allows the use of evidence obtained in
reasonable reliance on well-settled precedent” was applicable in refusing
to retroactively apply the new Fourth Amendment rules. Id. at 1268.
McCarran-Ferguson Act (“MFA”) – Pre-emption of State Law: Safety
Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London, 587 F.3d
714 (5th Cir. 2009)
The 5th Circuit addressed the issue of whether implemented treaty
provisions are reverse-preempted by state law under the MFA. Id. at 731.
The court noted that the 2nd Circuit determined that when a treaty is not
self-executing and thus relies on an act of Congress for implementation,
the implementing legislation is reverse-preempted by state law under the
MFA. Id. The 5th Circuit agreed that when the provisions of a treaty are
not self-executing, enforcement of the provisions in a United States court
depends on implementation by Congress. Id. However, the 5th Circuit
disagreed with the holding of the 2nd Circuit and found that the “Act of
Congress” referred to in the MFA cannot be seen as distinguishing
between treaties that require implementation by Congress and those that
do not. Id. Thus, the 5th Circuit held that implemented treaty provisions,
self-executing or not, are not reverse–preempted by state law pursuant to
the MFA. Id.
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EMPLOYMENT LAW
Long Term Disability Plans – Material Duties: Darvell v. Life Ins. Co.
of N. Am., 597 F.3d 929 (8th Cir. 2010)
The 8th Circuit addressed whether the “phrase ‘material duties of
his . . . regular occupation’ [under a disability plan] can be interpreted as
referring to the duties that are commonly performed by those who hold
the same occupation as defined by the DOT (a ‘generic’ approach), or
the duties that the specific claimant actually performed for his employer
(a ‘claimant-specific’ approach).” Id. at 935. The court noted that the 6th
Circuit follows the “generic approach,” while the 3rd and 10th Circuits
follow the “claimant-specific approach.” Id. at 936. The 8th Circuit
reasoned that “‘[o]ccupation’ is a more general term that seemingly
refers to categories of work than narrower employment terms like
‘position,’ ‘job,’ or ‘work,’ which are more related to a particular
employee’s individual duties.” Id. The 8th Circuit further noted that
“where plan fiduciaries have offered a ‘reasonable interpretation’ of
disputed provisions, courts may not replace [it] with an interpretation of
their own . . . .” Id. at 935. Thus, the 8th Circuit concluded that the
insurance company’s “interpretation of ‘material duties of his . . . regular
occupation’ is not contrary to clear language of the [p]lan” and therefore,
the disability plan can be interpreted under the “generic approach.” Id. at
936.
Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) – Evidence Necessary to
Establish Incapacity: Schaar v. Lehigh Valley Health Servs., 598 F.3d
156 (3d Cir. 2010)
The 3rd Circuit addressed “whether a combination of expert and lay
testimony can establish that an employee was incapacitated for more than
three days as required by the FMLA’s implementing regulations” in
order to establish the statute’s requisite serious medical condition. Id. at
157. The court noted that the 5th and 9th Circuits found lay testimony
alone sufficient to establish incapacitation under the FMLA, while the
8th Circuit held that lay testimony could only be used “to supplement
incomplete medical evidence.” Id. at 160. The court looked to the
Department of Labor regulations, which do not require a health care
professional to make the determination of incapacity, and stated that lay
testimony should therefore not be categorically excluded when making
an incapacity determination. Id. at 161. However, the court disagreed
with the 5th and 9th Circuits, finding that some medical testimony is
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necessary to establish causation between the incapacitation and the
serious health condition, so that employers are not faced with a heavy
burden to “inquire into an employee’s eligibility for FMLA leave based
solely on the employee’s self–diagnosed illness.” Id. Thus, the 3rd
Circuit held that “an employee may satisfy her burden of proving three
days of incapacitation through a combination of expert medical and lay
testimony.” Id.
Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) – Front Pay: Traxler v.
Multnomah County, 596 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2010)
The 9th Circuit addressed whether “the court, rather than the jury,
determines the amount of the front pay award” under the FMLA. Id. at
1009. The court noted that the 4th, 5th, and 10th Circuits have agreed
that “the approach in these cases follows the general recognition that
front pay is best understood as a substitute for the equitable remedy of
reinstatement, and thus, is appropriately determined by the court.” Id. at
1011. The court also noted that the 6th Circuit “[d]iffers [by] holding that
the district court determines the propriety of awarding front pay, but that
the jury decides the actual amount of the award.” Id. The 9th Circuit
agreed with the 4th, 5th, and 10th Circuits in finding that an award of
front pay is “an alternative to reinstatement [and] is derived solely from
the statutory provision permitting the court to award ‘such equitable
relief as may be appropriate.’” Id. at 1011–12. The court disagreed with
the 6th Circuit as the statute does not support splitting “the availability of
front pay . . . [as] a judicial determination and the amount a jury
determination.” Id. at 1012. Thus, the 9th Circuit concluded “[t]hat under
the FMLA, front pay is an equitable remedy that must be determined by
the court, both as to the availability of the remedy and the amount of any
award.” Id. at 1011.
Rehabilitation Act – Independent Contractor: Fleming v. Yuma Reg’l
Med. Ctr., 587 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2009)
The 9th Circuit addressed whether § 504(d) of the Rehabilitation
Act, “which refers to ‘the standards applied under title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act [ADA]. . . as such sections relate to
employment,’ incorporates Title I literally or selectively.” Id. at 939. The
9th Circuit needed to resolve this question in order to determine the
primary issue of whether § 504 extends to a “claim of discrimination
brought by an independent contractor.” Id. at 939. The court noted that
“if Title I is incorporated literally, then the Rehabilitation Act is limited
by the ADA and only covers employer-employee relationships in the
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workplace.” Id. However, as the court pointed out, if Title I is
incorporated selectively, “the Rehabilitation Act covers all individuals
‘subject to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance,’ who may bring an employment
discrimination claim based on the standards found in the ADA.” Id. The
court noted that the 6th and 8th Circuits determined that Title I of the
ADA is incorporated literally, while the 10th Circuit found Title I to be
incorporated selectively. Id. The 9th Circuit agreed with the 10th Circuit
in finding that while § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act “incorporates the
‘standards’ of Title I of the ADA for proving when discrimination in the
workplace is actionable,” it does not incorporate Title I in totality. Id.
The court disagreed with the 8th Circuit’s position that the “similarity”
between Title I and the Rehabilitation Act leads to the conclusion that
both statutes apply to “employer-employee” relationships, and therefore
do not extend coverage to independent contractors. Id. at 946. Although
reluctant to state that 6th Circuit precedent bore directly on the issue, the
9th Circuit disagreed with the 6th Circuit’s conclusion that the ADA and
Rehabilitation Act “borrowed” the definition of “employer” from Title
VII of the ADA. Id. Thus the 9th Circuit concluded that § 504
“incorporates the ‘standards’ of Title I of the ADA for proving when
discrimination in the workplace is actionable, but not Title I in toto, and
therefore the Rehabilitation Act covers discrimination claims by an
independent contractor.” Id. at 939.
IMMIGRATION
Good Faith Marriage Waiver – Jurisdiction: Contreras-Salinas v.
Holder, 585 F.3d 710 (2d Cir. 2009)
The 2nd Circuit addressed whether the court had jurisdiction to
review the discretionary decision of the Attorney General to grant or
deny a waiver under 8 U.S.C. §1186a(c)(4), which requires an alien to
file a “good faith marriage waiver” to remain in the country post divorce
from a United States citizen. Id. at 713. The court noted that the 9th
Circuit determined that “despite the clear language committing
credibility determinations to the ‘sole discretion of the Attorney
General,’ . . . courts nevertheless retain jurisdiction to review such
determinations.” Id. at n.4. Further, the 9th Circuit “relied on the
legislative history . . . [and] concluded that the statutory history
demonstrates beyond any question that Congress adopted this language
for the specific purpose of putting a stop to immigration officials’
practice of employing overly-strict evidentiary rules when determining
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the credibility of battered women, and not in order to limit judicial
review of credibility decisions.” Id. (emphasis in original). Here, the 2nd
Circuit disagreed with the 9th Circuit, finding that by the statutory
language “Congress . . . demonstrates an unambiguous intent to limit
judicial review.” Id. Thus, the 2nd Circuit concluded that it lacked
jurisdiction to review petitioner’s challenges to the credibility and weight
of the findings by the Immigration Judge and Board of Immigration
Appeals and held that such discretion is left solely to the Attorney
General. Id.
Repeal of Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) – Reliance: Canto
v. Holder, 593 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010).
The 7th Circuit considered “whether th[e] petitioners who opted to
go to trial ‘relied’ on the continued existence of equitable relief under
section 212(c) in foregoing [their] legal right” to an appeal. Id. at 643.
The court noted that the 4th and 11th Circuits require actual reliance,
requiring a petitioner to “show that he actually subjectively relied on the
prior law in the criminal proceedings resulting in his conviction.” Id. On
the other hand, the court pointed out that the 3rd, 8th, and 10th Circuits
have utilized an objective reliance standard, by which a petitioner merely
needs to “establish that relevant circumstances gave rise to interests upon
which it would have been objectively reasonable for a petitioner to rely
on the prior law in deciding to give up a legal right.” Id. Additionally, the
court noted that the 1st and 9th Circuits made no distinction between
these two forms of reliance and “have categorically held that petitioners
who chose to go to trial could not possibly have relied on the continued
existence of section 212(c) relief.” Id. The court stated that it has
previously agreed with the 1st and 9th Circuits “holding that relief under
former section 212(c) only remains open to: (1) petitioners who pled
guilty prior to section 212(c)’s repeal; or (2) ‘aliens who conceded
deportability before AEDPA’s enactment, with the expectation that they
could seek waivers under § 212(c).’” Id. at 643–44. However, the court
noted that the instant case presented “a slightly more nuanced argument .
. . that [petitioner] forwent his legal right to appeal his conviction in
reliance on his continued ability to seek section 212(c) relief.” Id. at 644.
The 7th Circuit pointed out that, with the exception of the 4th Circuit,
“the circuits are generally in agreement that the Supreme Court prefers a
categorical approach over an individualized analysis when deciding
whether an alien relied on the continued existence of section 212(c) in
forgoing a legal right.” Id. As such, the court stated that it also has
“followed the categorical approach, finding that the category of aliens
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who went to trial did not forgo any possible benefit in reliance on section
212(c),” a category which also “necessarily includes those aliens that
went to trial, but chose not to appeal.” Id. Thus, the 7th Circuit held that
it is “more likely than not that the existence of section 212(c) [would] not
affect [the] decision about whether to appeal” a conviction. Id. at 645.
LABOR LAW
Defense Base Act (“DBA”) – Court of Initial Review: Serv. Emples.
Int’l, Inc. v. Dir., 595 F.3d 447 (2d Cir. 2010)
The 2nd Circuit addressed “whether the initial review of decisions
of [a DBA] Benefits Review Board . . . lies in the courts of appeals or in
the district courts.” Id. at 452. In enacting the DBA in 1941, Congress
“extended the already existing provisions of the Longshore and Harbor
Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA), enacted in 1927, to provide
workers’ compensation coverage for those engaged in maritime
employment.” Id. At the time the DBA was enacted, “the LHWCA
provided for initial review of administrative compensation orders in the
federal district court for the judicial district in which the injury
occurred.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Congress later
amended the LHWCA, “providing for initial review of compensation
claims in a newly created administrative board (the Benefits Review
Board) and for judicial review in the courts of appeals,” but Congress
“made no change in DBA § 3(b), which continued to provide that
judicial proceedings be conducted in accordance with the LHWCA and
in the district court.” Id. The 2nd Circuit noted that Congress intended
that “the DBA track the provisions of the LHWCA” and that the statutes
should establish a “unified scheme.” Id. at 454. The court further noted
that the legislative purpose of the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA was
to “expedit[e] the processing of compensation claims and permit[]
appeals of agency decisions directly to the courts of appeals without the
extra step of district court proceedings.” Id. The 2nd Circuit recognized
that the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 11th Circuits have all held that DBA § 3(b)
“unambiguously provides that a party adversely affected by the
administrative resolution of a DBA claim must file a petition for review
in the United States [D]istrict [C]ourt.” Id. 453 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Nevertheless, the 2nd Circuit disagreed with those circuits and
joined the 7th and 9th Circuits in holding that § 3b of the DBA “vest[s]
jurisdiction in the courts of appeals.” Id.
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PROPERTY LAW
Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) – Discrimination: Bloch v. Frischholz, 587
F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009)
The 7th Circuit addressed whether a violation of § 3617 of the FHA
“can exist without a violation of §3604 or any other FHA provision.” Id.
at 781. The court noted that the 2nd Circuit and the Southern District of
Texas determined that § 3617 and § 3601 are co-extensive; therefore, a
violation of one is a violation of the other. Id. However, the District of
Nebraska and the Northern District of Illinois held differently. Id. The
7th Circuit disagreed with the 2nd Circuit, noting that although it had
held in some instances that the statutes were co-extensive, the present
case suggested a different construction. Id. The court decided that
defendants may have “interfered” with plaintiffs’ § 3604 rights, even
though plaintiffs had not proved a § 3604 violation, thereby suggesting a
§ 3617 violation without a §3604 violation. Id. The court noted that
holding otherwise “would make § 3617 entirely duplicative of the other
FHA provisions.” Id. Thus the 7th Circuit concluded that “a § 3617 claim
might stand on its own.” Id. at 782.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Telecommunications Act of 1996 – Adequate Writing: Helcher v.
Dearborn County, 595 F.3d 710 (7th Cir. 2010)
The 7th Circuit addressed “[w]hat is necessary for an adequate
writing under the Telecommunications Act.” Id. at 717. The court noted
that the 1st, 6th, and 9th Circuits determined that the “in writing
requirement is met so long as the written decision contains a sufficient
explanation of the reasons for the permit denial to allow a reviewing
court to evaluate the evidence in the record supporting those reasons.” Id.
at 718. The 8th Circuit, however, follows an approach “that strike[s] a
balance between a dubious, literal reading of the Act and a pragmatic,
policy-based approach.” Id. The 7th Circuit agreed with the 1st, 6th and
9th Circuits in finding the “primary purpose of the “in writing”
requirement for the Telecommunications Act is to allow for meaningful
judicial review of the decisions of local governments. Id. at 719. Thus,
the 7th Circuit concluded the “in writing [requirement] is adequate if it
provides an explanation that allows [a court], in combination with the
written record, to determine if the decision is supported by substantial
evidence.” Id.
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Title IX – Notice Requirement: Mansourian v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., 594 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2010)
The 9th Circuit addressed whether “pre-litigation notice and
opportunity to cure is necessary in cases alleging unequal provision of
athletic opportunities in violation of Title IX.” Id. at 1105. The court
noted that the 5th Circuit determined that “the requirement in the sexual
harassment cases—that the academic institution have actual knowledge
of the sexual harassment—is not applicable for purposes of determining
whether an academic institution intentionally discriminated on the basis
of sex by denying females equal athletic opportunity,” while the 8th
Circuit found the notice requirement applies without any analysis. Id. at
1106. The 9th Circuit agreed with the 5th Circuit in finding that “[i]t
would also be inconsistent with funding recipients affirmative
obligations to provide nondiscriminatory athletic participation
opportunities and continually to assess and certify compliance with Title
IX.” Id. The court disagreed with the 8th Circuit, finding that its
approach is inconsistent with application of the notice requirement. Id.
Thus, the 9th Circuit concluded that the “notice requirement is
inapplicable to cases alleging that a funding recipient has failed
effectively to accommodate women’s interest in athletics.”

CRIMINAL MATTERS
SENTENCING
Aggravating Crime – Hypothetical Felony Approach: United States v.
Hector Santana-Illan, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 28536 (10th Cir. Dec. 29,
2009)
The 10th Circuit addressed whether the hypothetical felony
approach permits a court to examine the crime for which the defendant
could have been prosecuted or only the crime that was actually
prosecuted when determining if an aggravating crime occurred. Id. at *7–
8. The court noted that the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 6th Circuits determined that
the hypothetical felony approach only permits courts to examine the
crime actually prosecuted, while the 5th and 7th Circuits found that
courts could base a decision on the crime that could have been
prosecuted. Id. at *8. The 10th Circuit agreed with the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and
6th Circuits in finding that the inclusion of the word “hypothetical” in the
hypothetical felony approach does not permit courts to make ex-post
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determinations about what crimes an individual might have been charged
with. Id. at *12–13. The court disagreed with the 5th and 7th Circuits
primarily because the Supreme Court had already rejected the approach
that courts may look back through a defendant’s record to determine
what crime they could have been prosecuted for. Id. at *16. Thus the
10th Circuit concluded that “the hypothetical federal felony approach
permits us to examine only the state crime that was actually prosecuted.”
Id. at *11.
Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) – Violent Felony: United States
v. Lee, 586 F.3d 859 (11th Cir. 2009)
The 11th Circuit addressed whether a “non-violent walkaway
escape is a violent felony for purposes of the [ACCA]” after the Supreme
Court’s decision in Chambers v. United States, __ U.S. __ , 129 S. Ct.
687 (2009). Id. at 866. The 11th Circuit noted that prior to Chambers, all
the circuits except the 9th Circuit “held that all escapes were crimes of
violence and/or violent felonies.” Id. at 867. After Chambers, the 11th
Circuit found that “several of [its] sister circuits ha[d] overruled their
prior precedents and concluded that walkaway escapes [we]re no longer
properly classifiable as violent felonies under the ACCA or crimes of
violence under the Sentencing Guidelines,” specifically the 3rd, 6th, and
7th Circuits. Id. at 869. The 11th Circuit agreed with these circuits in
finding a non-violent walkaway escape from unsecured custody is not
sufficiently similar in kind or in degree of risk posed to the ACCA’s
enumerated crimes to bring it within § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)’s residual
provision. Id. at 874.
Career Offender Designation – Reduction for Overrepresentation:
United States v. Munn, 595 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2010)
The 4th Circuit addressed “[w]hether § 3582(c)(2) authorizes a
district court to grant a motion for a reduced sentence when the
sentencing court designated the defendant as a career offender but then
found that the career offender designation overrepresents his criminal
history.” Id. at 187–88. The court noted that the 2nd and 11th Circuits
had determined that “§ 3582(c)(2) and the accompanying Policy
Statement require only that a defendant’s sentence be ‘based on’ a
subsequently amended guideline range,” while the 8th Circuit found that
the “designation of a defendant as a career offender precludes a sentence
reduction under § 3582(c)(2).” Id. at 189–91. The 4th Circuit agreed with
the 2nd and 11th Circuits in finding that “a defendant’s career offender
designation does not bar a § 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction based on
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Amendment 706 if (1) the sentencing court granted an
Overrepresentation Departure from the career offender guideline range,
and (2) the court relied on the Crack Guidelines in calculating the extent
of the departure.” Id. at 192. The court disagreed with the 8th Circuit,
stating, “the Sentencing Guidelines do not compel the conclusion that a
sentencing court must determine a defendant’s applicable guideline range
before granting an Overrepresentation Departure.” Id. (emphasis in
original). Thus, the 4th Circuit concluded that “§ 3582(c)(2) authorizes a
district court to grant a motion for a reduced sentence when the
sentencing court designated the defendant as a career offender but then
found that the career offender designation overrepresents his criminal
history.” Id. at 188.
Career Offender Designation – Robbery as Crime of Violence: United
States v. Gregory, 591 F.3d 964 (7th Cir. 2010)
The 7th Circuit addressed whether a defendant’s robbery conviction
counted as a crime of violence, thus classifying the defendant as a career
offender under the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 966. The court noted
that “the [4th] Circuit has sided with [the defendant], while the 3rd, 9th,
and 11th Circuits have taken the government’s position,” and that the
“2nd Circuit has come close to the government’s position as well.” Id. at
967. The court determined that “[t]he difference of opinion centers on the
question whether, in addition to distinguishing between adult and
juvenile convictions, the Guidelines also call for distinguishing between
adult and juvenile sentences, depending on whether the sentence is
imposed pursuant to the adult or juvenile criminal code.” Id. (emphasis
in original). The 7th Circuit found that “[t]he 4th Circuit concluded that
the Sentencing Commission did adopt the latter refinement. The word
‘imprisonment,’ it said, applies only to adult convictions, whereas the
word ‘confinement’ applies to both juvenile and adult dispositions.” Id.
The 7th Circuit further noted that “[t]he remaining courts have not been
persuaded by this line of argument.” Id. The 7th Circuit was not
persuaded by the 4th Circuit’s approach, which found “it difficult to
believe that the Commission would have made such an important point
about juveniles convicted as adults using such subtle linguistic signals.
Id. If the Commission had wanted to draw such a sharp distinction
between juveniles with adult convictions sentenced as adults and those
sentenced as juveniles, it would have done so more clearly.” Id. Thus, the
7th Circuit concluded that “the critical question is whether the juvenile
was convicted as an adult, not how he was sentenced.” Id.
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Authority of the Federal Bureau of Prison – Early Release: Handley v.
Chapman, 587 F.3d 273 (5th Cir. 2009)
The 5th Circuit addressed whether the Federal Bureau of Prison
(“BOP”) used reasonable exercise of its statutory authority in
“implementing regulation that categorically excludes early-release
eligibility for those inmates whose ‘current offense is a felony . . . [t]hat
involved the carrying, possession, or use of a firearm.’” Id. at 276. The
court noted that the 3rd and 8th Circuits found the exclusion of inmates
who carried a firearm from early-release eligibility was a valid exercise
of BOP authority, while the 9th, 10th and 11th Circuits did not. Id. at
278. The 5th Circuit reasoned that under 18 U.S.C. 3621(e), “the [BOP]
has the discretion to determine eligibility for early release consideration.”
Id. at 279. Additionally, the court reasoned that in the interest of public
safety, “[t]he [BOP] recognizes that there is a significant potential for
violence from criminals who carry, possess or use firearms while
engaged in felonious activity . . . [t]hus . . . these inmates should not be
released months in advance of completing their sentences.” Id. at 280.
Thus, the 5th Circuit concluded that due to the “public safety rationale,”
the BOP used reasonable exercise of its statutory authority in excluding
inmates who carried a firearm from early-release eligibility. Id.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Sexual Offenders Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”) –
Offense Registration: United States v. Cain, 583 F.3d 408 (6th Cir.
2009)
The 6th Circuit addressed whether defendants convicted prior to the
enactment of SORNA were required to comply with the terms of
SORNA before the Attorney General issued an implementing regulation
mandating retroactive adherence. Id. at 410. The court noted that of the
five circuits to have addressed the issue, the 4th, 7th, and 10th Circuits
have held that SORNA did not apply to certain offenders until the
Attorney General specified its retroactive application. Id. at 415. The 6th
Circuit, however, did not address the perspectives adopted by the other
circuits, and instead, evaluated the issue utilizing the following factors:
plain meaning of subsection 16913(d); the title of subsection 16913(d);
the subsection’s relation to subsection 16901; textual ambiguity; and
legislative history. Id. at 414–417. In doing so, the 6th Circuit agreed
with the 4th, 7th, and 10th Circuits, concluding that “SORNA explicitly
required the Attorney General to specify the applicability of the Act to
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persons convicted prior to the effective date of SORNA.” Id. at 410.
Accordingly, persons convicted prior to SORNA’s enactment were not
required to comply with the terms of the Act prior to the Attorney
General’s specific mandate. Id.

